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Liability Limitations in International Data Traffic:
The Consequences of Deregulation
by Tedson J. Meyers*
T he growing importance of international data traffic has generated a
rich literature" to which this volume is added. The issues involved
have become part of policy agendas both in the United States2 and
abroad.3 Initial materials have framed policy and legal concerns for law-
yer and scholar alike.4 Among other topics, these initial analyses have ad-
* Senior Attorney, Peabody Lambert & Meyers, P.C., Washington, D.C.; Chairman, In-
ternational Telecommunication Committee, Section of Science and Technology, American
Bar Association; Member of the Board, U.S. Council for World Communications Year 1983;
A.B. (1949), M.A. (1950), New York University; J.D., Harvard University (1953). The views
expressed are not those of Mr. Meyers' law firm nor of the American Bar Association. For
assistance in preparation of this article, the author is grateful to colleagues in his firm: Rob-
ert C. Godbey, Esq., associate; Joanna T. Horsfall, telecommunications policy analyst; and
Ruth Ulferts, librarian.
IDuring the last ten years, the subject of international communication law and policy
has benefited from a growing stream of excellent materials, both descriptive and analytical.
The following provide a rich variety of viewpoints from which to begin research: U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, THE INFORMATION ECONOMY." DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT (1977); W.
DIZARD, THE COMING INFORMATION AGE (1982); K. LEESON, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS,
BLUEPRINT FOR POLICY (1983); ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY. A
SOURCFOOK (J. Yurow ed. 1983); Spero, Information: The Policy Void, 48 FOREIGN POL'Y
139 (1982); Feldman & Garcia, National Regulation of Transborder Data Flows, 7 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 1 (1982); Ling, Risk Allocation in International Interbank Electronic
Fund Transfers: CHIPS & SWIFT, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 621 (1981); and the invaluable sym-
posia in 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980), and Teleinformatics, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203
(1981).
2 See generally NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
LONG RANGE GOALS IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AN OUTLINE FOR UNITED
STATES POLICY, S. RE-P. No. 22, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). This report assembles in one
place an exceptional array of relevant references and strategic recommendations.
f Examples for working agendas addressed or to be addressed shortly abroad can be
found in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEvELOPMENT (OECD), PRELim-
NARY PROGRAMMED FOR THE SYMPOSIUM ON TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS, OECD Doc. No.
DSTI/ICCP 83.20 (June 1, 1983). See also OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK ON THE LEGAL As-
PECTS OF TRANSBORDER FLOWS, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP 82.5 (Jan. 11, 1982); PROBLEMS
OF LIABILITY CONNECTED WITH TRANSBoRDER DATA FLOWS, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP
82.28 (Aug. 30, 1982).
4 Students and working lawyers may find Yurow, supra note 1, an especially practical
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dressed barriers to the transborder flow of information, 5 the developing
concept of "trade in information," the legal status of data and data own-
ership' and the extraterritorial application of national laws.8
Consistently, these issues have shifted from soft ambiguities to hard
realities for U.S. business and government, as foreign administrations
have either taken action unilaterally9 or developed policy collectively. 0
tool. Prepared under the auspices of the Federal Communications Bar Association and Ge-
orgetown University, it organizes for the first time in one substantial volume, references
essential for initiating research work in the fields of international communication law and
policy. See also Novotny, Transborder Data Flows: A Bibliography, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 181
(1980) (for a useful listing of earlier articles published during the 1970's, see id. at 193);
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF INFORMATION PROCESSING SocmEms, TRANSBORDER DATA FLows:
CONCERNS IN PRIVACY PROTECTION AND FREE FLOw OF INFORMATION (R. Turn ed. 1979).
5 See S. NORA & A. MINc, L'INFORMATIZATION DE LA SOCIETE (1978) (trans. as THE COM-
PUTERIZATION OF SocIErY (1980)). This report, made to the President of France, kindled pol-
icy interest worldwide in the powerful role computerized information flows now play in com-
merce and social behavior within and among nations. See also HONDIUS, EMERGING DATA
PROTECTION IN EUROPE (1975); Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows:
Privacy Protection or Nontariff Trade Barriers?, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1055 (1978);
Fishman, Introduction to Transborder Data Flows, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980); ASSESS-
MENT OF THE TRANSBORDER DATA FLow PROBLEM: ELEMENTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL DATA POL-
ICY, reprinted in OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP 77.46 (Mar. 5, 1979); Markoski, Telecommu-
nications Regulations as Barriers to the Flow of Information, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287
(1981).
6 Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Challenge of the New Information Technologies: A
Teleinformation Strategy for the 1980's, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 237 (1981); Leeson & Jacob-
son, Trade in Telecommunication Equipment and Services, in Yurow, supra note 1.
7 de Sola Pool & Solomon, Intellectual Property and Transborder Data Flows, 16
STAN. J. INT'L L. 113 (1980); Robinson, Giving Legal Title to Data (paper presented to the
Conference of Swedish and Norwegian Societies for Computers and Law, Stockholm, Jan.
21-22, 1982), reprinted in 5 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 153 (1982); OECD, SWEDISH PROPOSAL
ON COPYRIGHT ON DATA BASES, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP 83.27 (June 9, 1983).
' See Turn, Privacy Protection and Security in Transnational Data Processing Sys-
tems, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 67 (1980). For a proposal to assure equivalent data protection
between contracting parties of differing nations, see Note, Contracts for Transnational In-
formation Services: Securing Equivalency of Data Protection, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 157
(1981).
9 Privacy or data protection laws have been passed in several countries to secure per-
sonal information as it crosses international borders. "Persons" are not limited to natural
persons in all cases. National privacy laws are in effect in Austria, Canada, Denmark,
France, West Germany, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway and Swe-
den. Privacy laws also protect personal information in the United States. These laws key to
natural persons, however, and to discrete kinds of information (educational, financial, etc.)
rather than to methods of transfer. Legislation is expected to become law in 1984 in Austra-
lia, Belgium, Finland, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Draft legislation is
under consideration in Brazil, Mexico, Greece and Italy. See Bortnick, International Infor-
mation Flow: The Developing World Perspective, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 333 (1981) (discus-
sion of varied approaches within non-industrialized nations).
10 OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PER-
SONAL INFORMATION, OECD Doc. No. ISBN 92-64-12155-2 (Mar. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
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Flows of information across national borders are increasingly dense; 1 pre-
liminary analyses of those flows have been undertaken to establish the
kinds of information now transmitted.12 Studies now underway are ex-
ploring the economic implications'13 of these transborder data flows while
taxes and tariffs for different kinds or classes of information are under
discussion.1 4
I. LLBmrry: A GROWING CONCERN ABROAD
The subject of liability for errors and omissions in international data
transmission is also receiving substantial consideration in international
forums. 5 Studies and staff reports developed under the auspices of the
OECD GumELINEs] and the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108,
are examples of international agreements promulgated to address privacy and transborder
data flows. Austria, Belgium, Greece, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom have endorsed
the OECD Guidelines. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United
Kingdom have acceded to the Council of Europe Convention. Only France, Norway, Spain
and Sweden have ratified the Convention. With the anticipated ratification by either Aus-
tria or Luxembourg during 1984, the Convention will come into force. Of particular concern
in the United States are the more rigid terms and inflexible application of the Council of
Europe Convention as against the voluntary OECD Guidelines. Extensive examination of
international policy development, contrasting voluntary and compulsory regimes, is availa-
ble in materials referenced supra note 1. For a discussion of their differing implications, see
Eger, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformation: An Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
203, 213-17 (1981).
" Investment in undersea cable, terrestrial and satellite facilities is increasing concur-
rent with more efficient use of bandwidth.
12 In the OECD, a two-phase analysis of international data flows has been undertaken.
Phase I culminated in the promulgation of the OECD Guidelines, supra note 10. Phase 11
addresses the flows of non-personal, corporate and institutional data. As a preliminary step,
the analyses of legal and economic issues have been undertaken separately.
1" See OECD, TRANSBoRDER DATA FLows IN INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES: BASED ON RE-
SULTS OF A JOINT BIAC/OECD SURVEY AND INTERvIEws wrrH FIRMS, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/
ICCP 83.23 (Oct. 25, 1983). This report reflects research undertaken over a two-year period
into the kind and quantity of transborder data flows. A written survey instrument was fol-
lowed up with individual personal interviews of corporate executives. See also OECD, SYN-
THESIS REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF PRI-
vAcY AND TRANSBORDER FLows OF PERSONAL DATA, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP 83.17, and
OECD, THE INTERNATIONAL DATA MARKET REvIsrTED, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP 83.25.
14 See Madec, Economic and Legal Aspects of Transborder Data Flows (1), OECD Doc.
No. DSTI/ICCP 80.26 (1980) (part H only of this final report published June 1982, by Docu-
mentation Francais).
'5 PROBLEMS OF LiAB-.TY CONNECTED WITH TRANSBORDER FLOWS, supra note 3; OECD,
LumrrY ISSUES RELATED TO TRANSBORDER DATA FLows, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP 83.16
(June 6, 1983).
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) make
clear the intensity of interest with which these issues are addressed in
industrialized nations.16 Consistently, these discussions address the
proliferation of parties engaged in any one international transaction, with
consequent uncertainty of responsibility for error.17 International data
traffic moves through an increasingly complex and automated chain of
elements including: telephone ("voice") and hard copy or data ("record")
carriage; storage and forwarding of data (and occasional "refiling" to
counter traffic overflows), and the collection, processing and automated
dissemination of materials, normally by computer. Ultimately, the user,
who may in fact be serviced at many foreign addresses or through several
intermediate destinations, receives the information in some intelligible
form. Regrettably, the variety of participants involved, each with a spe-
cialty, as well as the separate national sovereignties enroute, renders com-
plete end-to-end accountability virtually impossible.
Liability for errors related both to the use and the transmission of
data is presently under review in the OECD.' s Its Secretariat observes:
The main problems encountered in determining liability are due to:
(1) the number of transactors involved in data flows and thus the
wide range of potentially harmful behavior;
(2) the newness of the technology and the consequent lack of preci-
sion as regards liability arising from its use, the difficulty of deciding who
is liable and the resulting problems of what evidence is required.19
As a result, an OECD study already underway attempts, in part, to
In many OECD countries, public utilities such as PTTs enjoy broad exemptions
and immunities under the local law. Many PTTs, however, are beginning to take
on a business structure, offering new services or viewdata services. In the former
example, a public data network takes on the proprietary aspects of a time-sharing
company, offering services in competition with the private sector. In the latter
example, the lines blur when one seeks to distinguish between the acts of the
viewdata service and the PTT acting as the underlying carrier of the service. How
are PTTs addressing liability issues which arise with regard to the new
businesses?
Letter from William H. Edgar, Director, Office of Int'l Trade, U.S. Dep't of State, to H.P.
Gassman, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD, reprinted in 5 TRANS-
NAT'L DATA REP. 60 (1982).
1a PROGRAMME OF WORK ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSBORDER FLows, supra note 3.
17 LIABILITY IssuEs RELATED TO TRANSBORDER DATA FLows, supra note 15.
'a PROGRAMME OF WORK ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSBORDER FLows, supra note 3;
OECD, LIABILrrY FOR ERRORS IN ELECTEONIC TRANSBORDER DATA FLows, OECD Doc. No.
DSTI/ICCP 82.23 (July 12, 1983); LIABILITY IssuEs RELATED TO TRANSBORDER DATA FLows,
supra note 15; OECD, LIABILITY Issus RELATED TO TRANSBORDER DATA FLows, OECD Doc.
No. DSTI/ICCP 83.31 (June 28, 1983).
19 PROGRAMME OF WORK ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSBORDER FLows, supra, note 3,
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"[h]ighlight the acute problems encountered in certain countries, e.g., evi-
dence and the burden of proof, the use of public data networks and the
limitation of liability."20
The latter concern, the limitation of liability, addresses the shelter
traditionally afforded communications common carriers in the United
States and most other nations from consequential damage for errors and
omissions. 21 The desirability and extent of such limitations of liability
have weight in the debate abroad.2 However, deregulation" of enhanced
services 24 in the United States may be viewed as removing the traditional
underpinnings of such limitations of liability from interstate services no
longer provided under regulation, exposing the service provider to com-
mon law doctrines of liability.2 5 This exposure will also apply to enhanced
20 Id at 3.
21 See generally OECD Documents, supra note 15, for a discussion of the limitations of
liability in the context of contemporary international debate. For systematic review of cases
and related state and federal authorities dealing with carrier liability and limitations
thereon, see Annot., 67 A.L.R.3D 76 (1975, Supp. 1983); 74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommunications
§ 48 (1974 & Supp. 1983); Annot. 92 A.L.R.2D 917 (1963 & Supp. 1982).
22 OECD, LIABmrrY FOR ERRORs IN ELECTRONIC TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS, OECD Doc.
No. DSTI/ICCP 82.23, at 4 (July 12, 1982).
22 In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Sec-
ond Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), modified, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), further
modified, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer & Communications Industry
Ass'n v. F.C.C., 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Computer II]. This deci-
sion was the key ruling eliminating or narrowing F.C.C. regulation of major communications
industry segments. The Commission embarked upon the Second Computer Inquiry to:
[Floster a regulatory environment conducive to the stimulation of economic activ-
ity in the regulated communications sector with respect to the provision of new
and innovative communications-related offerings; and.., enable the communica-
tions user to optimize his use of common carrier communication facilities and ser-
vices by taking advantage of the ever increasing market applications of computer
processing technology.
77 F.C.C.2d 384 at 1 107.
24 Computer II, supra note 23, divided communications services into two categories:
"basic" and "enhanced." "A basic transmission service is one that is limited to the common
carrier offering of transmission capacity for the movement of information. In offering this
capacity, a communications path is provided for analog or digital transmission of voice,
data, video, etc. information." 77 F.C.C.2d at 93. Basic Service remained regulated under
the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (as amended). "En-
hanced" services, on the other hand, are "services offered over common carrier transmission
facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications
that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's trans-
mitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured informa-
tion; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (1982).
Enhanced services as defined in Computer II are not regulated. Id. at subpara. (a).
25 The impact of deregulation on tariffed liability limitations are addressed generally in
this article. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text for specific discussion of these
implications.
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international services if ultimately they, too, are furnished on an unregu-
lated basis. The implications of such exposure will be discussed in this
article. A decision clarifying whether U.S. deregulation principles are to
be applied by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to inter-
national services is long-awaited by interested parties and, observers in
the United States and overseas.26 Conclusive determination of this issue
becomes more imperative now as pressure mounts abroad for review and
revision of traditional limitations on liability for international data
transmissions.
Review of these limitations in the context of regulatory change may
prove valuable in understanding international trends. Thus they are the
subject of this article. Existing U.S. law is emphasized, including evident
or anticipated changes resulting from on-going industry restructure. Fa-
miliarity with U.S. practice and trends is essential in international delib-
eration because it is targeted as the source of potential inequities 27 and
because it is the regime most routinely to be examined during litigation.2
Nevertheless, litigation of cases generated by errors and omissions in
international data transfer has been rare.29 Those cases which have been
decided focus on isolated incidents of electronic transfer of funds among
banking institutions."0 Increased dependence on communications for dip-
lomatic relations and international business, together with the advent of
competition and the potential for rapid proliferation of service providers,
raises the stakes. Thus, traditional treatment of liability for errors and
omissions in international data traffic is already the subject of official ex-
pressions abroad of both public and private dissatisfaction."'
Many of the criticisms expressed address potential problems rather
than past or current ones. Data transmissions presently account for a rel-
21 In re G.T.E. Telenet Com. Corp., and In re Tymnet, Inc., 91 F.C.C.2d 232 (1982),
appealed sub nom. G.T.E. Telenet Com. Corp. v. F.C.C., appeal docketed, No. 82-2207
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1982). See also more complete discussion of the implication of this case
infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
2' Liability for Errors in Electronic Transborder Data Flows, supra note 18.
28 Id.
29 PROBLEMS OF LIABILITY CONNECTED WITH TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS, supra note 3, at
2-3.
so See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982); Delbrueck & Co. v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979). The opinion of Posner, J.,
in Evra is viewed as a significant application of the principles of liability for consequential
damages established in the leading common law case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (1854), to modern electronic transfers. See also Lingl, supra note 1.
31 "[Q]uestions are beginning to be asked concerning the future. Must one accept this
general rule of exclusion or limitation of liability? Must the risks of utilization of new infor-
mation technologies be left to the final user? Concern is beginning to be expressed and some
tentative solutions being put forward." LIABILITY ISSUES RELATED TO TRANSBORDER DATA
FLOWS, supra note 18, at 3-4.
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atively small share of international communications traffic. Errors have
been consigned to the realm of technical failure, and attention paid prin-
cipally to improvement in facilities rather than to revision of legal
regimes.3s
Overseas data traffic is generated principally by governments and
multinational corporations. Commentators assert that the strong capitali-
zation of such users, their sophisticated understanding of the technology
and their famliarity with traditional limitations on carrier liability have
led them to accept the risks of errors and omissions, establishing a natu-
ral barrier to litigation.3 3 It is also asserted, however, that the trend is
toward attraction of smaller users from all nations to the international
data market, users more dependent upon the full variety of specialized
service providers to arrange data transfer end-to-end.3 4 It is argued that
these users will be less prepared to deal with the traditional placement of
liabilities for errors and omissions or the uncertain locus of responsibility
for such failures.3 5 As the market burgeons with a mix of such smaller
users, incidents of lost data or errors in transmission could increase, gen-
erating substantial uncovered losses and increased litigation.
II. UNDERLYING REGULATORY CONTEXT
In preparing to consider these issues, U.S. participants should expect
to deal with materials written abroad purporting to analyze U.S. treat-
ment of liability. These include studies submitted "to make a point."
Thus, lawyers addressing international liability problems should first ex-
plore and understand the underlying doctrines in U.S. law. This requires
familiarity with the distinctions between telephone and telegraph deci-
sions, as well as differing trends among the states and between state and
32 For example,
In practice, the users of transborder data flows and those who have organised the
networks for conveying such flows seem uptill [sic] now to show little interest in
problems of liability. This is due to the high technical reliability of the equipment
used for transborder data flows and the widespread preference of users and prov-
iders of services for improving technical solutions rather than consideration of the
possible legal repercussions of errors, alteration or other events for which they
may be liable.
PROBLEMS OF LIABILrrY CONNECTED WITH TRANSBORDER DATA FLows, supra note 3, at 2-3.
3 Id.
3 LuBmurry IssUEs RELATED TO TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS, supra note 18.
35 Id.
38 European bodies addressing these issues favor legislative solutions characteristic of
civil law countries. Omnibus treatments move readily in that environment, all the more so
when the problems to be resolved comprise parts of larger political or economic agendas
which have greater priority than painstaking analysis of law and fact. For a discussion of
contrasting reaction to pressures for legislative solution in the field, see Eger, supra note 5.
See also Ramsey, supra note 6.
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federal courts. Liability suits entailing interstate telephone service have,
in fact, been rare; subscribers evidently prefer to act against their local
carrier in state courts.3 7 Litigation against interstate telegraph carriers,
therefore, comprises a considerable share of the federal decisions, 8s in-
cluding decisions applying relevant federal statutes.3 9 Significant doctri-
nal distinctions emerge in the results, in part because of the different
characteristics of telegraph and telephone information transfer.40 The in-
fluence of these differences should be traced carefully in dealing with lia-
bility issues, as the federal rulings have particular application to interna-
tional communications common carriers.
Summarizing U.S. experience, it is fair to observe generally that
claimants seeking redress from U.S. communications common carriers for
errors and omissions in the discharge of their public duties can anticipate
only limited recoveries. 41 In the United States, telephone and telegraph
companies have not been held to the "strict liability" generally applied to
common carriers. 42 Thus, they are not insurers of the performance of
their respective duties. Rather, telephone and telegraph companies are
liable for "such damages and only such as naturally and proximately arise
from their negligent performance of their duty as to the transmission and
delivery of messages. ' 4 3 The applicable doctrines may differ in nuance
but tend consistently to shelter service providers from massive awards in
all states and at the federal level.
37 With the notable exception of the earlier operator-related cases, persistent service
interruptions predominate as the ground for lawsuits, proceeding in such instances against
the local operating company. The preference of claimants to file in state courts against local
carriers is striking. This appears to be the case, even where the communications entailed
was interstate and the requisite minimum sums were present. See generally Annot., 67
A.L.R.3D 76, supra note 21.
38 See, e.g., suits against carriers for damages pursuant to Sections 206 and 207 of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1962 & Supp. 1983). Of cases reported
under these sections, claims against telegraph rather than telephone carriers predominate.
See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207 (1962 & Supp. 1983).
39 Id.
40 See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
4' See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.3D 76, supra note 21.
42 See Abraham v. New York Tel. Co., 85 Misc. 2d 677, 380 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1976); Vin-
son v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 188 Ala. 292, 66 So. 100 (1914); Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Glawson, 13 Ga. App. 520, 79 S.E. 488 (1913). See also Manley v. New York Tel.
Co., 303 N.Y. 18, 100 N.E.2d 113 (1951) (following the same doctrine that communications
companies are not insurers in the manner of other common carriers). Compare Chesapeake
& P. Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399, 7 A. 809 (1887) (obligation of commu-
nications carrier to perform respective public duties parallels the obligations of a railway
company).
" 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 21, at 384.
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A. Telephone Carriers: "Suppliers of Conduit"
Addressing first the substantial body of rulings settling the liability
of telephone carriers, it is clear that they are obliged to exercise, as a
public service, a character and degree of care, diligence and skill commen-
surate with their undertaking. 44 A line of cases evolved around the early
common law recognition of common carrier duties, which addressed lia-
bility for breach of those duties and established the concept that negli-
gence is not attributable to the carrier merely because of its presence in
the chain of transmission. 5 Further, these early decisions determined
that liability will not attach where the relationship between the carrier's
failure and the injury sustained was merely speculative 4 6 and that dam-
ages, to be recovered, must either have been within the contemplation of
the carrier and the subscriber when contracting or have been "the prod-
uct of special circumstances of which the [carrier] had notice and from
which the likelihood of the injury in question could reasonably have been
inferred.' '4
7
44 Vinson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel Co., 188 Ala. 292, 66 So. 100 (1914); Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Glawson, 13 Ga. App. 520, 79 S.E. 488 (1913). See also Pollock v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 289 Mass. 255, 194 N.E. 133 (1935); 74 Ai. JUR. 2D, supra
note 21, at 367. Earlier cases and related material are gathered in Annot., 78 A.L.R. 661
(1932).
4' Liability in the chain of transmission affects determinations of responsiblity in end-
to-end services comprising successive independent providers, a configuration typical of in-
ternational data transmissions. "In determining the duties and liabilities of connecting lines
of telegraph companies, the courts are governed to a great extent by the principles applica-
ble in the case of successive carriers of goods." 74 Am. JuR. 2D, supra note 21, at 393. See
also Miller v. East Ascension Tel. Co., 263 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 1972), cert. denied, 262 La.
1121, 266 So. 2d 430 (1972).
46 Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Glawson, 13 Ga. App. 520, 79 S.E. 488 (1913); Amer-
son v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1957); Lebanon, Louisville &
Lexington Tel. Co. v. Lanham Lumber Co., 131 Ky. 718, 115 S.W. 824 (1909). See also
Annot., 67 A.L.R.3D 76, supra note 21, at 93. Compare Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Carter, 1 Tenn. Civ. App. 750 (1911) (an early "lifeline" decision, imposing liability on the
carrier after finding adequate relationship between injuries sustained and the carrier's fail-
ure, even when injuries were to a member of the family other than the telephone
subscriber).
47 Annot., 67 A.L.R.3D 76, supra note 21, at 119.
[Recoveries] should be restricted to [incidents] which might fairly and reasonably
be considered as either arising naturally, according to the usual course of things,
from the breach of the contract seen to exist between the subscriber and the tele-
phone company, or those which might reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract ....
Id. Common law distinctions were also attempted between contract and tort theories of
liability, the contract theory predominating. See Foss v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 26 Wash. 2d
92, 173 P.2d 144 (1946) (raising, as is not uncommon in these telephone and telegraph cases,
the doctrines of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), as dispositive of liability
and measurement of damages); Barrett v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 N.H. 354, 117 A.
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Advances in technology have favored the telephone carrier in avoid-
ing judicial imposition of liability. The introduction of automated ex-
changes eliminated contact with the operator, who was the subscriber's
customary "point of notice" to the carrier in early emergencies most
likely to generate litigation.48 Courts have protected telephone carriers in
several more contemporary instances, noting that the complexities of ad-
vanced telephone exchanges render transmission more vulnerable to un-
noticed failure.'9
Judicial treatment of errors and omissions by carriers in the related
area of directory listings may offer some insight as to the carrier's growing
role as an information provider.50 Alphabetical directories and classified
directories tend to be differentiated both in administrative regulation and
in judicial decisions. 51 Doctrines generated in early cases dealing with
transmission and related service failures apply with the same general re-
sults to errors and omissions in alphabetical listings. Classified directo-
ries, however, generally are treated within areas unaffected by regulation
and are thus properly the subject of private contract by the carriers.2
Errors and omissions in classified directories normally violate no public
duty,53 and clauses limiting liability in such cases tend to be judged by
public policies observed in the respective states."
264 (1922). Compare Valentine v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 388 Mich. 19, 199 N.W.2d 182
(1972) (liability limitations imposed in tariff could be circumvented by pleading in tort
rather than for breach of contract, but allegations actually failed to support either negli-
gence or gross negligence).
48 Failure to "wake up the operator" surfaces throughout earlier claims for damages,
principally in telephone but also in telegraph cases, prior to installations of automated ex-
change or message forwarding systems. See, e.g., Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 26
Tex. Civ. App. 79, 63 S.W. 1076 (1901).
4' See Holman v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1973), quoting
with approval Wilkinson v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 327 Mass. 132, 97 N.E.2d 413
(1951): "Because of the complexities and intricacies of the modern telephone system in
which the personal element has been substantially eliminated and much if not all of the
means of making usual telephone calls is left to mechanical devices, such a regulation [limit-
ing liability] is not unreasonable." Wilkinson, 97 N.E.2d at 416.
50 See generally, Annot., 92 A.L.R.2D 917, supra note 21, for review of telephone com-
pany liability for directory errors and omissions. Treatment of classified directories after
industry restructure commencing in 1984 is addressed extensively in the "divestiture" case,
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
81 See, e.g., McTighe v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1954); Mc-
Grew v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 109 Neb. 264, 190 N.W. 783 (1922). Compare Cole v. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 416, 246 P.2d 686 (1952).
8 McTighe v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1954); Baird v. Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co., 208 Md. 254, 117 A.2d 873 (1955).
53 "It was not disputed that the classified directory was outside [the telephone com-
pany's] duties of public service and was a 'vehicle to secure advertising."' McTighe v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1954).
Compare Muskegon Agency v. General Tel. Co., 340 Mich. 472, 65 N.W.2d 748 (1954)
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Contrasted against this background is judicial disposition of errors
and omissions in the delivery of telegraph messages in the United States.
It is in the telegraph cases, rather than the telephone cases, that expan-
sive interpretations of the carriers' basic duties are found. Those duties
rendered the telegraph carrier liable to the addressee and sender
alike"5 -a liability arising not out of the contract between sender and car-
rier, but out of a broader obligation for public service.56
B. Telegraph Carriers: "Deliverers of Content"
Underlying the significant body of law regarding telegraph service is
the historic obligation of a telegraph carrier to deliver "hard copy"
messages for its customer. A significant factual distinction becomes evi-
dent, between telephone and telegraph systems of information transfer:
telephone carriers did not customarily undertake to transmit specific
messages for their subscribers, but merely undertook to provide raw cir-
cuits for their use (on a call-by-call basis in the preponderance of cases,
and for extended periods in the case of leased or private lines).57 Furnish-
ing the communication channel, however, apprised the telephone com-
pany of neither the content nor importance of any single message passing
through it,58 and replacement of the telephone operator with automated
circuits removed the traditional human intervenor to whom the signifi-
cance of particular messages was reported.59
This "conduit versus content" distinction warrants further examina-
tion. It would not be surprising for the new observer to confuse modern
high-speed data delivery with the traditional telegraph model. However,
data streams destined for hard copy print-out in the United States and
overseas bear little resemblance to telegraph traffic. Data traffic, both do-
and Newsham v. United Tel. Co., 2 Pa. D. & C. 2d 312 (1954) with Hamilton Employment
Service v. New York Tel. Co., 253 N.Y. 468, 171 N.E. 710 (1930).
55 Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 254 N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 557 (1927); McPeek v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 Iowa 356, 78 N.W. 63
(1899). Compare Western Union Tel. Co. v. Green, 153 Tenn. 59, 281 S.W. 778 (1926), reh'g
denied, 153 Tenn. 522, 284 S.W. 898 (1926).
" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Milton, 53 Fla. 484, 43 So. 495 (1907).
57 Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Glawson, 13 Ga. App. 520, 76 S.E. 488 (1913). See
also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Carter, 181 Ark. 209, 25 S.W.2d 448 (1930); PROBLEMS OF
LAILrTy CONNECTED wrrH TRANSBORDER DATA FLows, supra note 3, at 6.
" "Millions of calls are made daily, many of which involve matters of enormous mone-
tary amounts, and to subject the Telephone Company to liability unlimited as to damages
would expose it to claims which could not be controlled or estimated." Memorandum, Justi-
fication for Regulations Limiting the Liability of the Telephone Company, submitted in
support of Transmitttal Nos. 13337, 13350, In re American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, Proposed Revisions of Tariff F.C.C. No. 260, Tariff F.C.C. No. 267, Tariff F.C.C. No.
259, and Tariff F.C.C. No. 263, 76 F.C.C.2d 195 (1980).
" Supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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mestic and international, occupies channels and is paid for in commercial
arrangements characteristic of telephone, not telegraph, service. Sophisti-
cated data systems resemble the distinctively two-way voice communica-
tion model. As is normally the case with telephone subscribers, data sys-
tems users are in a position to verify delivery, recognize isolated error or
system failure and respond."0 By contrast, senders of telegraph messages
could not be expected to know that a message had been garbled in trans-
mission unless special arrangements were made and a premium was paid
for that service which resulted in greater carrier liability.
Whether the "conduit/content" distinction was dispositive in early
telegraph carrier liability cases is not clear, and no general separation
should be attempted. Yet, the cases do seem to reflect (without pointed
delineation) a softer line for a failure to transmit a message accurately
than for a failure to get at least some version of the message to its desti-
nation, or failing that, to notify the sender of the inability to deliver.6 1
Advancing technology brought a higher level of responsibility to tele-
graph carriers as opposed to telephone carriers. The "singularity" of the
hard copy telegraph message appears to have carried a heavier responsi-
bility for accuracy and delivery than was generally applied to telephone
facilities.6 2
III. THE LEGISLATIVE MODEL: THE ROLE OF THE REGULATORY AGENCY
State and federal statutes s adopted throughout the late 19th and
early 20th centuries establish further grounds for carrier liability. The
Communications Act6 4 declares:
In case any common carrier shall do, or cause to be done, any act,
matter, or thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or
shall omit to do any act, matter or thing in this chapter required to be
60 See LuDLTy FOR ERRORS IN ELECTRONIC TRANSBORDER DATA FLows, supra note 22,
at 14-17.
61 See generally, 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 21, at 396-404.
61 Unlike the dilution of liability, supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text, with the
advent of the automated telephone exchange, it has been observed:
Inasmuch, therefore as this art or science had not then been perfected to anything
like the exactness, either mechanically or scientifically, that it now possesses, tele-
graph companies should be held to a higher degree of care at the present time,
with improved, perfected machinery, instruments, equipment, appliances, and
competent, careful, and expert operators, than could have been exacted of them in
the early days of telegraphy.
74 Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 21, at 385-86. See also Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18
Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910).
63 For a discussion of the relative powers of state and federal governments in communi-
cations regulation, see 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 21, at 316.
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons in-
jured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained .. . ."
However, neither state nor federal statutes afford users a distinctive
advantage, as the same laws and regulations which recognize carrier lia-
bility also authorize or ratify a wide variety of limitations upon that lia-
bility.6" Outright exemption from liability is not countenanced.6 7 Rather,
recovery limits are specified and accounted for in carrier rate planning.68
State courts normally endorse such limitations as conforming to the pro-
visions of state public utility regulations .6  Limits are also supported as
preventing the discriminatory application of lawful rates.70 Although judi-
cial tests for reasonableness are often applied 7 1 liability limitations are
adversely affected only in cases of gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct.72 State determinations on contract or tariff provisions which at-
tempt to limit a carrier's liability have been divided, but most have opted
in favor of carrier-proposed liability limitations.
7 3
Efforts to limit liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct,
however, normally have been rejected at the state level regardless of au-
thorized contractual or tariff limitations.7 4 State courts either interpret
tariffs or state regulations as not limiting liability, 5 or they examine the
carrier conduct independently and, finding gross negligence, rule that the
published limitations are inapplicable to the specific conduct involved.
7 6
65 Id. § 206.
64 See Triangle Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. Bell Tel. Co., 109 PITrSBURGH LEGAL J.
205 (1961); Waters v. Pacific Tel. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161 (1974); Wilkinson v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 327 Mass. 132, 97 N.E.2d 413 (1951).
'7 Triangle Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. Bell Tel. Co., 109 PITSBURGH LEGAL J. 205
(1961). See also 74 Am. JuR. 3D, supra note 21, at 428 n.38.
" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566 (1921).
69 See cases cited supra note 66. But cf. Valentine v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 288 Mich.
19, 199 N.W.2d 182 (1972) (questioning the applicability of tariffed limitations of liability to
claims in tort).
70 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 555 (1920).
71 Triangle Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. Bell Tel. Co., 109 PITTS3URGH LEGAL J. 205
(1961).
72 See Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894); Waters v. Pacific Tel.
Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161 (1974).
7 Compare Wilkinson v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 327 Mass. 132, 97 N.E.2d 413
(1951), with Product Research Associates v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 651, 94
Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971). California is viewed as maintaining strong public policies restricting
limitations of liability.
74 See Holman v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1973). Com-
pare Held v. New York Tel. Co., 73 Misc. 2d 582, 342 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1973) (prima facie case
of gross negligence warranted denial of telephone company's motion to dismiss).
7' Held v. New York Tel. Co., 73 Misc. 2d 582, 342 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1973).
78 Id.
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IV. THE FEDERAL (AND INTERNATIONAL) RULE
For interstate and, therefore, international carriage, the federal rule
is clear and it is contrary to the state practice. In Western Union Tele-
graph Company v. Priester, the U.S. Supreme Court definitively placed
even gross negligence beyond judicial scrutiny for carriers subject to fed-
eral jurisdiction, asserting liability limits prescribed under lawful tariffs.77
Interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act as it existed in 1928, Mr. Jus-
tice Stone wrote that a tariffed limitation of liability approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission "became the lawful condition on which
messages might be sent.' '7  He added:
Such being the basis of liability, we do not perceive any adequate ground
upon which it may be enlarged merely by application of a "vituperative
epithet" to the admitted fault of the petitioner .... [W]e may not disre-
gard a lawful exercise of the regulatory power which has made no distinc-
tion between degrees of negligence, nor may we, upon any theory of pub-
lic policy, annex to the rate as made conditions affecting its uniformity
and equality.
79
Fifty-five years later, the application of Priester to interstate carrier
liability remains undisturbed.8 0 Only the carrier's willful misconduct is
beyond the protective limits of liability established under tariffs approved
by the FCC,8s although there is reason to conclude that even that excep-
7 276 U.S. 252 (1927). Priester moved to the Supreme Court through a procession of
Alabama summary judgments, trials, affirmations and reversals narrated by the Court. Id. at
257-58.
71 Id. at 259.
79 Id. at 259-60.
80 See In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 76 F.C.C.2d at 198; Ivy Broadcasting Co. v.
AT&T, 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); Shows v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 F. Supp. 498
(W.D. La. 1952).
Prior to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the subject, there
was a large body of authority to the effect that while a telegraph company might
adopt rules and regulations to exempt it from liability for negligence, the rules did
not exempt it from liability for gross negligence.
74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 21, at 431 n.57 (observing that numerous cases evidently were
overruled by the Supreme Court in this decision).
8' According to the FCC:
The Telephone Company's liability, if any, for its willful misconduct is not limited
by this tariff. With respect to any other claim or suit, by a Customer or by any
others, for damages associated with any aspect of the provision of service... the
Telephone Company's liability, if any, shall not exceed an amount equal to the
initial period charge applicable for such a message to the called station. This lia-
bility shall be in addition to any billing adjustments that may otherwise be
appropriate.




tion may reflect prudence or diplomacy in carrier management rather
than confidence in the precise limits of the federal law.
8 2
It is that law, moreover, which governs international communication
in the United States. The Communications Act authorizes the FCC to
regulate "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate
or foreign communications by wire or radio."' 3 The Communications Act
also prescribes the basic framework for the filing of tariffs and schedules
of charges, 84 and establishes the liability for damages caused by carriers
subject to the FCC's jurisdiction.8 5
Liability limits in international tariffs currently on file with the FCC
reflect the risks associated with the services rendered. Thus, the interna-
tional tariffs of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)8 6 reflect the
company's present "conduit only" business. The tariffs limit "damages
associated with the installation, provision, termination, maintenance, re-
pair and restoration of service. 8 7 In support, AT&T notes: "The Tele-
phone Company does not transmit messages for customers but only
makes facilities and equipment available for use. Thus, the Telephone
Company cannot make certain or insure the completion of 'important
telephone calls.' "88
It will be instructive, however, to monitor AT&T's liability limita-
tions post-divestiture. Major structural elements of its services will re-
main interstate.8 9 International services will continue, but its fundamen-
tal character as a "conduit only" system of information transfer is poised
for change. 0 Aided by advances in technology, AT&T is expected to em-
ploy new marketing opportunities in the United States and overseas to
become a supplier of communication and information services more va-
ried in form and more content-oriented than any major domestic tele-
phone model previously known.9
The liability limitations of those international carriers presently sup-
plying a mixed menu of tariffed services vary noticeably from AT&T's.
Carriers providing both facilities and "per call" services employ alternate
82 It may be observed that Priester did not differentiate between "gross negligence"
and "willful misconduct" in its enforcement of tariffed limitations of liability. In fact, cases
in this field have not arrived at a perfect distinction between the two forms of conduct.
' 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
" Id. § 203.
85 Id. § 206.
" Supra note 80.
57 Id.
88 Memorandum, supra note 58.
89 See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (modified final
judgment).
0 See, e.g., O'Reilly, Ma Bell's Kids Fight for Position, FORTUNE, June 27, 1983.
91 Id.
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limitations. For facility interruptions, some version of the AT&T model is
followed.9 2 For call or message services, the tariffs follow the Western
Union model, specifying both a monetary cap93 on the carrier's liability
for standard calls or messages and a formula to ascertain higher levels of
recovery for specially valued calls or messages "whether caused by the
negligence of its servants or otherwise."'"
This array of liability limits is currently accepted by the FCC. Ca-
veat, many such tariffs have been permitted to go into effect under spe-
cial provisions of the Communications Act 5 while awaiting final action as
to their lawfulness.9 6 No case has specifically tested the enforcement of
92 See, e.g., RCA Global Communications Telex Service, Tariff F.C.C. No. 90, §
2.1.7(B):
In the event of an interruption to the service which is not due to the negligence or
willful act of the customer, there will be a prorata adjustment of the charges in-
volved for the service and facilities rendered useless and inoperative by reason of
the interruption during the time said interruption continues from the time it is
reported to the Company or detected by the Company, provided, however, that
insofar as it is practical to do so, any interruption during the initial period of
service will be compensated for in the form of overtime equal to the interruption
time.
See also RCA Global Communications, Tariff F.C.C. No. 79 (Overseas Datel Service), § 6;
W.U. Int'l, Tariff F.C.C. No. 5 (Int'l Overseas Telex Service) § 4.7; Tariff F.C.C. No. 11
(Overseas Datel Service), § 4.05; ITT World Communications, Tariff F.C.C. No. 48 (Int'l
Datel Service), § 9; Graphnet, Tariff F.C.C. No. 3 (Graphnet Int'l Service), § 4.1.15; Tymnet,
Tariff F.C.C. No. 3 (Int'l Data Communication Service), § 4.1.2.
93 At the present time, a $500 limitation is specified in all such tariffs. See, e.g., W.U.
Int'l Overseas Telex Service Tariff, supra note 92, at § 4.72. Attorneys in the FCC's Office of
General Counsel report that the $500 monetary limitation was prescribed for telephone and
telegraph carriers by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1919.
9 E.g., RCA Overseas Datel Service Tariff, supra note 92, at § 6(c):
(c) Special Provision With Respect to Occasional Service
(1) The liability of the Company for damage arising out of mistakes, omis-
sions, interruptions, delays or errors or defects occurring in the course of furnish-
ing service under this tariff, whether caused by the negligence of its servants or
otherwise, shall in no event exceed five hundred dollars for, or in connection with,
any call; provided however that in the case of a call rendered with a statement in
writing specially valuing such call and for which payment is made of the amount
of the regularly established rate plus an additional charge equal to one-tenth of
one percent of the amount by which such written valuation shall exceed five hun-
dred dollars, the liability of the Company for damages arising out of mistakes,
omission, interruptions, delays or errors or defects occurring in the course of fur-
nishing service under this tariff, whether caused by the negligence of its servants
or otherwise, shall in no event exceed the sum at which such call shall be valued.
g 47 U.S.C. § 204(b) (1976).
E.g., ITT World Communications, Tariff F.C.C. No. 43 (Overseas Private Line Ser-
vice), now in effect, has never been the subject of a Commission finding of lawfulness under
the Communications Act. In other instances the Commission has found tariffs specifically to




liability limits contained in such "interim" tariffs. It is important, there-
fore, to bear in mind that all cases, including Priester, which establish or
reinforce the validity of tariffed liability limitations qualify their rulings
by addressing them to tariffs "conforming to regulation," or "approved by
the regulatory authority" or "lawful. ' 7
V. CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION
The FCC's landmark carrier deregulation rulings further complicate
the treatment of liability. Services previously regulated will no longer be
provided to customers under terms and conditions prescribed by federal
tariffs. "Detariffing" has already occurred in some instances, 8 although
these changes have affected only domestic rather than international
services.
The consequences of deregulation on liability limitations for both do-
mestic and international traffic have yet to be fully appreciated. United
States-based services which were previously regulated will be governed
instead by the common law doctrines of contract and tort liability appli-
cable to like services provided under private contract. It would be reason-
able to expect a return to case-by-case, "preregulation" ways of arriving
at acceptable limitations of liability in contract clauses. All relevant com-
mon law precedents, however, derive from cases which arose out of the
earlier technologies. Such precedents will now have to be applied to the
burgeoning area of enhanced communications services. Neither the facili-
ties (telephone) model nor the hard copy (telegraph) models which pre-
vailed before regulation under state and federal statutes began, relates to
these new services.
Trial and appellate courts can be expected to dominate the develop-
ment of new rules for liability limitations in contracts entered into by
service providers and their customers. Courts will apply state and federal
laws, common law doctrines and public policies applicable in their respec-
tive jurisdictions. Federal district courts are likely to be the principal are-
nas for decision making.99 Gone, however, will be Priester's strong shield
barring judicial intervention in the regulatory process. Liability limits will
no longer bear the presumption of reasonableness or legality. Instead, dis-
tinctions will have to be drawn or established on a case-by-case basis in
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 337 Mass. 132, 97 N.E. 413
(1951); Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566 (1921).
98 G.T.E. Telenet, Tariff No. 1, Transmittal No. 42 (Mar. 17, 1983); Tymnet, Tariff No.
2, Transmittal No. 50 (Mar. 17, 1983).
" For discussion of the jurisdiction of federal courts in communications cases not aris-
ing under the Communications Act, see Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. AT&T, 391 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir. 1968).
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contemporary common law regimes that frown upon contractual provi-
sions which broadly limit liability for negligence. Non-regulated service
providers can be expected to resort to contract law as the principal legal
regime in which to sustain prevailing liability limitations. Service provid-
ers and customers alike, however, will have to reevaluate carefully all con-
tract clauses drafted originally as liability limitations in tariffs for previ-
ously regulated communications services. It is by no means certain that
carrier protections which flourished under the regulations can or will be
imported into contracts providing for the supply of enhanced services.
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME: PRIVATE CONTRACT V. OMNIBUS
TREATMENT
It is not certain, at the international level, that a system of standard
or negotiated contracts will comprise an acceptable legal regime for the
resolution of liability issues. In the OECD, attention is being given to the
cumbersome process of assigning legal responsibility through private con-
tracts between succeeding participants to a single international
transaction. 00
OECD reports have tried:
[T]o analyse how operators of Transborder Data Flows attribute the
risks inherent in the use of Transborder Data Flows through the use of
contracts. It was made clear that the "cascade" of contracts needed to
arrive at the final service offering prevented a clear sharing of liability.
Similarly, the current regime, because of the exclusion or limitation of
liability on the part of the data carrier, results in the nonliability or lim-
ited liability of the information and computer service providers.101
Efforts at harmonization of legal regimes internationally to address liabil-
ity issues are now the subject of discussion in the OECD.102 Reaction to
such efforts is not uniform.10 3 Views may be expected to stiffen, moreover,
as international service providers recognize the risk to prevailing
protections.
Differences thus generated are not likely to be resolved quickly. Even
while international debate over liability moves forward, U.S.-based ser-
100 OECD, LIABILITY FOR ERRORS IN ELECTRONIC TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS, OECD Doc.
No. DSTI/ICCP 82.23 (July 12, 1982).
'0 OECD, LIABILITY IssuEs AFFECTING NON-CONTRACTING PARTImS, OECD Doc. No.
DSTI/ICCP 83.26 (Nov. 4, 1983). In this study, Dr. F. Gurry of the University of Melbourne
presents a useful history and analysis of contract doctrines in the field.
'02 Id. See also OECD, LIABILrrY IssuEs RELATED TO TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS, OECD
Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP 83.31 '(June 28. 1983).
103 See, e.g., Address by George W. Coombe delivered at the OECD, Second Symposium
on Transborder Data Flows (London, Nov. 30, 1983) (entitled Legal Aspects of Transborder
Data Flows, The View from the Office of the General Counsel).
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vice providers are forced to await the outcome of a series of critical regu-
latory and appellate decisions.104 Until these cases are resolved, the op-
tions available to international service providers will continue to be few.
Several cases effectively postpone recognition of, and grappling with, the
international liability issues which will emerge after deregulation because
they postpone the application of deregulation itself in the international
arena. Enhanced services presently internationally provided by U.S. carri-
ers will not be voluntarily detariffed, nor will new unregulated services be
initiated until these pressing issues are resolved. Even if such policies be-
come clear in the United States, a favorable reaction must be won from
foreign administrations before operating agreements for service abroad
can be obtained.
Thus, it is important to examine the cases which must be decided
before U.S.-based service providers can fully confront the liability issues
generated by new international services.
The ultimate disposition of the FCC's initiative to apply doctrines of
deregulation uniformly to international as well as domestic services'015 will
be far-reaching in both political and economic implications. With few ex-
ceptions, foreign communications systems are the province of govern-
ments and their appointed agencies." 8 Principal among the exceptions
are the international carriers licensed (in international parlance, "private
operating agences recognized") by the United States to compete in the
field.107 United States-based international carriers presently conduct
many operations which presumably would be detariffed' 08 if deregulation
were made to apply on the same terms internationally as well as domesti-
cally. However, without carrier status, the ability of deregulated service
providers to obtain operating agreements with foreign administrations
could be compromised. 09 Moreover, under present FCC regulations and
international agreements which restrict resale and shared use of interna-
tional facilities, all service providers would be precluded from leasing or
continuing to lease circuits from international carriers for the provision
104 See cases cited supra note 26 and infra note 110.
101 In re G.T.E. Telenet, 91 F.C.C.2d 232 (1982).
I"0 See Ramsey, supra note 6, at 262.
107 International Telecommunications Union Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 31, 28
U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572: "Members reserve for themselves, for the private operating
agencies recognized by them and for other agencies authorized to do so, the right to make
special arrangements on telecommunications matters which do not concern Members in
general."
108 E.g., RCA, Tariff F.C.C. No. 100 (Q-Fax Service); ITT, Tariffs F.C.C. No. 66 (Uni-
versal Data Transfer Service) and No. 67 (International Worldfax Service).
10' See Graphnet Systems, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 402 (1977), reconsideration denied, 67
F.C.C.2d 1020 (1978); Consortium Com. Int'l, 76 F.C.C.2d 15 (1979); Int'l Relay, 77 F.C.C.2d
819 (1980).
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abroad of services newly classified as enhanced. 110
The long-deferred decision by the FCC of its controversial propo-
sal"' to permit such leasing arrangements of international circuits might
resolve that barrier domestically, only to generate new ones abroad. Re-
sale and shared use remain illegal under existing international practice," 2
and the FCC's unilateral proposal for change risks .retaliation from for-
eign administrations.'" Critical among retaliatory options available to
foreign administrations is the withdrawal from service of those private
circuits upon which major users depend for all forms of international
communication. Thus, too bold a move by the FCC could "boomerang"
against the very element of the market its proposal is intended to help.""
Abroad, study and debate over directions of liability limitations and
the placement of responsibility for error is not awaiting the outcome of
these proceedings." 5 Overseas interests pressing for legislative solutions
have a certain appealing logic to support them. Arguably, as international
data flows increasingly among nations, the greater number of mixed
specialites end-to-end invites "supranational" rules encompassing all par-
ticipants. Entry of the smaller user, it is claimed, compels revision of pre-
sent liability limitations for carriers and restrictions on the right of un-
regulated service providers to limit recoveries by contract. This shifts the
burden of loss to parties best situated either to prevent the damage, or to
absorb it. The state of the art and the stage of commercial development,
it is also argued, make the present an ideal time to reevaluate traditional
limitations of liability and to establish rules which transcend national
practices.
Clearly, such issues beckon the participation of interested U.S.-based
service providers. However unmistakable those interests would have been
before deregulation, the changes in potential exposure noted above make
imperative their awareness and participation now. It is not likely that ser-
vice providers will be responsive, however, until the application of dereg-
ulation to international service is clearly established at home, defining the
shape of the market and the new risks awaiting its participants.
Q
11 Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Int'l
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211 Id.
112 Id.
11 LONG RANGE GoALs, supra note 2, at 136-42.
114 Id.
115 Id.
Vol. 16:203
